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Abstract 
“The residues of freedom. […] tendencies toward true 
humanism”: thoughts on the role of the humanities at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century 
Remarks from Kant’s third critique, “The Critique of Judgement”, 
are taken as guidelines to develop a view on works of art as 
vessels of knowledge and judgements about what the world 
appears to be, can be and ought to be. In itself, Kant’s remarks 
amount to a justification of the study of the arts, i.e. it is for the 
sake of a world where human beings may experience other 
human beings as companions in the project to sustain human 
life. The viability of such an endeavour is borne out by, for 
example, a recent performance of Beethoven in a most adverse 
context, and by the fact of international treaties in the past 
decade against some of the most serious violations of human 
rights. These treaties could not have been possible were it not 
for the artistic explorations of the tragedies of these violations.  
                                      
1 Adapted from a paper originally read at a conference on “What are the 
humanities for? Valuing and re-valuing the humanities in South Africa”, 
Potchefstroom University, 12-14 September 2002. (12 September 2002 was the 
25th commemoration of the death of Steve Bantu Biko.) I am indebted to 
Johann Rossouw and Calvin Seerveld for incisive remarks which, due to lack of 
space in this article, will hopefully bear fruit in future work.  
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Opsomming 
“Oorblyfsels van vryheid […] neigings tot egte humanisme”: 
gedagtes oor die rol van die geesteswetenskappe aan die 
begin van die een-en-twintigste eeu 
Opmerkings deur Kant in sy derde kritiek, “The Critique of 
Judgement” (Die kritiek van die oordeelsvermoë), word gebruik 
as riglyne om ’n siening daar te stel dat kunswerke aangewend 
kan word as kanale vir kennis van en oordele oor hoe die 
wêreld skyn te wees, wat die wêreld kan wees en wat dit 
behoort te wees. Op sigself beskou, kom Kant se opmerkings 
neer op ’n regverdiging van die bestudering van die kunste ter 
wille van ’n wêreld waarin mense ander mense kan ervaar as 
metgeselle in ’n projek om menslike lewe te ondersteun. Die 
lewensvatbaarheid van so ’n onderneming word onder andere 
bewys deur ’n onlangse uitvoering van Beethoven in ’n uiters 
ongunstige konteks, en deur die feit dat internasionale verdrae 
teen sommige van die ernstigste skendings van menseregte 
gedurende die afgelope dekade gesluit is. Hierdie verdrae sou 
nie moontlik gewees het nie as dit nie was vir die artistieke 
verkenning van die tragedies van hierdie skendings nie.    
When I read Adorno’s studies on Gustav Mahler for the first time in 
1979 in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, the following words struck me 
in particular: 
Chained to culture, the work of art wants to burst the chain 
[and] show compassion for the shabby remains [of culture]. 
Every measure in Mahler makes the arms wide open (Adorno, 
1973a:187/38). 
The original German, Barmherzigkeit üben am schäbigen Rest; 
jeder Takt … öffnet weit die Arme, immediately made me think of my 
Potchefstroom mentor, colleague and friend, Theo van der Merwe. 
In an attempt to account for myself my curious response to Adorno’s 
text, I realised to what extent Theo’s own life and work was a 
veritable embodiment of this phrase. I remembered an incisive 
remark by him, when I was working on an assignment on Karl 
Mannheim under his tutorship, that it is a curious thing that the 
ideology of planning strives to guarantee freedom from want but 
does not venture to look for the one lost sheep. He was, of course, 
pointing to the issue of power relationships in almost any modern 
society. Experts plan the future, and individuals have to adapt their 
individual needs and prospects to the parameters of the master 
plan, and they have to be “educated” to do so because the planned 
parameters are the best rationally devised options. Experts care for 
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the average, and assume that almost everybody is capable of 
meeting the “minimal” demands of the average. Those who cannot, 
are “negligible”. Experts are only interested in majorities. 
Compassion is incommensurable with planning expertise. And when 
Christ’s followers succumb to the ideology of planning, they are wont 
to forget about the lost sheep and the lost coin. Theo van der Merwe 
brought Hendrik van Riessen’s critique of the ideology of planning to 
my attention, specifically its disparagement of human beings in their 
work. In contrast to this view Van Riessen called for a respect for 
what each human being may become in terms of God’s intention 
with her or him. “We may not deprive a human being of her calling. 
That will be an impairment of her humanity when we think and act in 
her behalf in such a way that her freedom becomes redundant” (Van 
Riessen, 1966:52; my translatation – JS). 
Thus when I read Adorno’s characterisation of Mahler’s work, I was 
surprised to recognise something I have already experienced in the 
life and work of somebody else. Theo van der Merwe lived respect 
for the calling of fellow human beings. My lasting impression of him 
will be of the philosopher, colleague and friend as interlocutor, 
mediator and someone who takes up the cudgels for whomever and 
whatever may be threatened by the indifference of the wielders of 
power. He was blessed (or burdened?) with a sense for and a 
feeling of responsibility towards the precious moment (kostelik, he 
always said in a slightly old-worldish way) in all encounters. The 
slightest nuance of a gesture, a word or an event was savoured and 
consigned to the haven of Theo’s memory. That is the reason why I 
would like to honour his memory with a reflection on the redemption 
of, as Theodor Adorno has formulated it, the residues of freedom 
and the tendencies towards true humanism as they are traceable 
through works of art. In doing so, I want to pay hommage to his 
profound respect for the inexhaustible variety of creation and of 
history, as well as his deep concern to understand whence the spirit 
that drives the human sciences.  
1. From concerto to concerted action 
It is generally known that Beethoven’s G major piano concerto 
(Opus 58) was whistled down at its first performance in Vienna in 
1807. The reason for the public’s reaction to this work was that it did 
not follow the established pattern of the genre. Instead of a festive 
introductory section for the orchestra before the entry of the soloist, 
this work started with an understated announcement of the key, a 
single G major chord, as well as the first theme, by the soloist, after 
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which the different sections of the orchestra took up the theme from 
different points in the tonic and developed it to land tutti on the G 
major key from where it is given over to the piano to lead further. 
These few bars contain some of the most revolutionary moments in 
Western music. Beethoven pushes the logic of the concerto as 
musical form to its limits. It is as if Beethoven were saying: if the 
concerto has come to mean the celebration of the capabilities of one 
particular instrument and one particular voice, why, then, cannot this 
voice – this artist as individual – be heard and seen to set the tone 
for the whole event or happening? Beethoven’s response, as can be 
seen from the performance indications, is demured. In the G major 
concerto we do not encounter the soloist who pitches himself 
bravura and fortissimo against the orchestra to wrestle and maintain 
the lead (as we can say of Tchaikovsky’s B minor concerto). The 
piano part of Beethoven’s G major concerto is a rather reluctant, 
even coy, step in the direction of the artistic, social and, ultimately 
political emancipation of the European, subtly confident of his/her 
own significance and not saturated by his/her own emotionality or 
inner life. 
Theodor Adorno’s characterisation of Beethoven’s music is very apt 
in this regard. He says: 
[For Beethoven] humanity means: you ought to behave like this 
music behaves. [It shows you the way towards] an active and 
busy life, in the service of others, not narrow-minded – a life of 
solidarity (Adorno,1994:28). 
What is at stake in this respect is a notion of art which implies that 
art represents in artistic formations that which lies beyond current 
concepts, however sophisticated these concepts may be. The short 
and the long of it is that this is Kantian language: “the beautiful is the 
symbol of the morally good” (Kant, 1793:258; see Kant, 1968). Of 
course, we have to know what beautiful and the morally good mean 
in this context, and how they are linked with humanity and solidarity. 
2. Beethoven, Kant and beauty 
2.1 The morally good 
Let us start with the morally good. When Kant speaks of the morally 
good in the context of his aesthetics, he is much more allusive than 
in his treatises on morals. A good cue is his reflections on the 
training of artists and the general education of people who want to 
have meaningful commerce with the arts. He mentions “a lasting 
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commonwealth”, and refers to the “happy combination” (of “law-
governed constraint” and “the force and rightness of a free nature”) 
(Kant, 1793:262). If one elaborates on this notion of “a lasting 
commonwealth”, and connects it to the well-known precepts of 
Kant’s view of morality, one can define the morally good, with some 
latitude, as the happy relationship (cf. Kant, 1793:198, 263) between 
individual desires and the truly common good of all. Many nuances 
of Kantian moral notions reverberate in this definition. And it is not a 
matter of stretching the imagination too far to hear Beethoven’s G 
major concerto resonating with Kantian ideals. The individual has to 
act in such a way that his/her acts enable the free acts of other 
individuals. Other persons’ freedom is the precondition for one’s own 
freedom. The lasting commonwealth is a space where people 
respect one another as aims and do not reduce them to means. The 
morally good is the (result of the) concerted effort of equal actors or 
agents, firstly in constantly critical dialogue with themselves over 
their own values, and secondly, as Habermas reformulated Kant, in 
constant dialogue with one another about their mutual vulnerability 
(cf. Habermas, 1988-1989). 
2.2 The judgement of beauty 
But what about the beautiful? Although one can have strong 
reservations about Kant’s subjectivism in this regard, his views are 
nevertheless important in the context of the project of the modern, 
i.e. the project where humanity has to take care of itself and its 
world. Judging something to be beautiful says at least as much of 
the one who is making the judgement as it says of the thing judged 
to be of that quality. Kant’s anatomy of the judgement of beauty 
shows the following: to make a remark about beauty is to express “a 
universal voice” (Kant, 1793:26), which means it is signifying the 
presence of a unique configuration of logical understanding and 
productive imagination at play (Kant, 1793:29-31). Through the 
experience of beauty the presence of possibilities not yet 
catalogued, categorised and labelled, announces itself in the 
awareness of a human being, thereby enhancing the already 
established richness of nature as it has become known in the laws 
of the natural sciences and the legislation of moral reason. The 
beauty of a flower or of crustaceans enlivens the mind not only to 
standard ideas of beauty, but in a curious way also to ideals of 
beauty (Kant, 1793:59-60), the “archetypes of taste” (Kant, 1793:54) 
or an “aesthetic idea” (Kant, 1793:56); in short: a kind of awareness 
that the observable configuration is in some way, in its 
pleasantness, also a sign (a cipher – chiffre is Kant’s word for it – or 
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a symbol) of what ought to be the case, not only in the world at 
large, but specifically among human beings. 
2.3 Kantian questions to be answered 
Reading Kant’s stringent anatomy of aesthetic judgement, one 
easily wonders if Kant is not becoming bewitched by his own 
conceptual world. That is indeed the case, but that is not our 
concern here. If this piling up of traditional aesthetic concepts in a 
new and unfamiliar sequence is bewildering, there is a way out of 
the apparent conceptual quagmire. Let us just pause to remind 
ourselves of the big questions of life that Kant wants to be answered 
by philosophy. The first question, What can I know? has been 
answered in the first critique, The Critique of Pure Reason, but in a 
double-geared way. Although there is the vast domain of nature and 
its causal laws that can be known by theoretical reason, there 
remains the profound realm of reason itself and its bearing on what 
we ought to do – the second big question that philosophy has to 
answer, and which is undertaken in Kant’s various writings on 
ethics, culminating in the second critique, The Critique of Practical 
Reason. Again that answer is double-edged: although we have 
come to know the absolute and very stark moral law in its 
formulation as the almost inhuman or superhuman categorical 
imperative, there remains something more, something deeper to be 
said. And this, I surmise, is Kant’s saving grace. After the question, 
What ought I to do? comes the question, What may I hope? 
Disenchanting the world through rigorously logical knowledge is not 
enough. Prescribing action motivated by rational principles 
regardless of feelings, circumstances or any investment of whatever 
kind, is not enough. The future can only be human and humane if 
whatever we know and do as human beings, is known and done 
fittingly, tastefully, appropriately, with, so to speak, “a sixth sense”. It 
is not enough to act in such a way that one’s action becomes a 
universal example. It is not enough to respect other people as the 
aims of their own life projects, and not to demean them always as 
means to one’s own ends. Morals without imaginative style is lifeless 
morality, perhaps immoral. The obverse also holds: imaginative style 
without morality is decadent. What is necessary, is the exercise of 
reflective judgement, i.e. to be able to find the universal significance 
to a given unique experience. That becomes possible when the 
mind is able and aware of its capability to grasp “aesthetic ideas”, 
which is, in the last instance, what works of art is all about. We need 
art because our profoundest ideals, the “rules for the proper use of 
our freedom”, have not been realised yet. “The lasting 
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commonwealth”, according to Kant, is a mere ideal, not historical 
reality. Although noble, it is in danger of turning from ideal to 
something evanescent. In art it is redeemed beyond current fashions 
and concepts. It is not so much denotated as connotated. As future, 
as something beyond the present historical configurations, art is the 
keepsake of open possibilities. 
That is the reason why Kant (1793:192) defines a good or “spirited” 
work of art as something that has 
... the ability to exhibit aesthetic ideas; and by aesthetic ideas I 
mean a presentation of the imagination which prompts much 
thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e. 
no [determinate] concept, can be adequate. 
2.4 Experiencing beauty deepens our knowledge of the 
world 
According to Kant there is a continuity in our experience of natural 
beauty and our experience of artistic beauty. As such the experience 
of beauty deepens our knowledge of the world as a system 
governed by laws which also, and paradoxically, accommodates 
human beings and their abilities to exceed mere causal nature by 
sublimating mere nature to ciphers in nature for the meaning of 
human life as freedom. In Kant’s view, artistic beauty is second to 
natural beauty – artistic beauty is an approximate appropriation of 
nature, realising its purposiveness. (In this respect Kant’s 
anthropomorphism and his modernist subject-centrism get the better 
of him: he holds the belief that nature finally is meant to make the 
fulfilment of human life possible. Nature is geared towards the 
human and moral “lasting commonwealth”. That, however, is a story 
for another occasion.) 
3. Art and the humanities 
This is the point I wish to make through Kant: In order for us to have 
a proper understanding of (fine) art, Kant calls for a “cultivating [of] 
our mental powers by exposing ourselves beforehand to what we 
call humaniora; they are called that presumably because humanity 
means both the universal feeling of sympathy (allgemeine Teil-
nehmungsgefühl), and the ability to engage universally in very 
intimate communication (sich innigst und allgemein mitteilen zu 
können)” (Kant, 1793:263). 
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Regardless of the circulatory aspect to Kant’s argument here 
(humaniora are preparatory to commerce with the fine arts while the 
fine arts are in a certain sense foundational to the humaniora), what 
one should recognise in this programmatic formulation of Kant is the 
two major concerns of the project of the modern, viz. “the universal 
feeling of sympathy” and “the ability to engage universally in very 
intimate communication”. This is the heart of Kant’s concern about 
what we may hope, and it is the heart of our current concern about 
the humanities. 
If I may allow myself to rehabilitate and redefine Kant’s notion of the 
“universal feeling of sympathy”, I shall say that it means the 
cultivated ability of the educated and informed modern (or 
postmodern) individual to relate to instances of humanity especially 
outside or beyond his/her immediate experience, and to recognise 
not only him-/herself in an other, but also to recognise the other as 
the other, without reducing or assimilating the otherness of the other 
to the self. Habermas’s reformulation of the notion of “the ability to 
engage universally in very intimate communication” is in line with the 
previous statement. The kind of communication that is required does 
not only entail the ability to converse and understand in terms of 
more or less universally shared meanings, or to convey uniquely 
individual experiences so that their ultimately common human roots 
can be understood, but also to be able to hold a conversation about 
meanings that have to be understood in order to maintain 
conversation. Communication is not only about sharing, but also 
about what sets apart and cannot or ought not to be shared (cf. 
Habermas, 1988-1989). Kant’s further commentary on these two 
modern priorities accommodates this extended sense: 
When these two qualities are combined, they constitute the 
sociability that befits [our] humanity and distinguishes it from the 
limitation [characteristic] of animals (Kant, 1793:263). 
• Geselligkeit or Glückseligkeit as elements of sociability 
In the first edition of the Critique of Judgement (1790) Kant referred 
to “sociability” as Geselligkeit (i.e. conviviability, companion-
ableness), and in the second edition (1793) he used the word 
Glückseligkeit (i.e. blissfulness, supreme happiness). The goal of 
the project of the modern, as Kant understood it, is to work towards, 
and in a society where human relationships are sustained by 
communicative interchange, sometimes as precondition and 
sometimes as a result of acting out of respect for the potentialities of 
what it means to be human. 
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• Kant: Individual desires and the common good of humanity 
Perhaps I am crediting Kant with too much. His ethics has been 
accused of being too formalist, harbouring the civil coldness that 
made Auschwitz possible (Adorno, 1967:354). Kant’s transcend-
entalist idealism has turned the human subject into an all devouring 
monster of meaning: everything other than the conscious human 
subject has only that kind of meaning that is a priori present in the 
mind of the subject – a kind of epistemological colonialism. In spite 
of these valid criticisms, I think it can be said in Kant’s defence that 
he also had an incisive view of the most crucial problem in the 
project of the modern, namely how to attain a sustainably viable 
relationship between individual desires and the common good of 
humanity.  
Kant recognises the problem of universalised particularity and true 
universal interests. In his essay on the meaning of Enlightenment/ 
enlightenment, he famously distinguished between the private use of 
reason and the public use of reason. It is very telling that he links the 
private use of reason to public institutions such as the state, the 
military and the revenue office. What this means is that, according to 
Kant, reason in these institutions is harnessed by a limited goal or a 
particular interest, ultimately to force people to conform to certain 
rules. These rules are tailored to maintain the functions of the limited 
domain of government, defence or revenue. They are applied in an 
equal way across the board. They are universalised from a limited 
position, and cannot be said to embody the real universal good of 
humankind. In a more recent context, it cannot be said that what is 
good for General Motors (or Enron, or the USA for that matter) is 
also good for the world. What is good for the world has to be 
ascertained against a norm that really fits the world, and in terms of 
Kant’s distinction, that has to be done by the really public use of 
reason, i.e. in a public forum beyond the confines of particular 
institutions and their peculiar dynamics of interests. Kant puts his 
money on philosophy, Habermas invests in public discourse and 
civil initiatives, John Rawls invents the experiment of the veil of 
ignorance. What it all boils down to, more or less, is that mature, 
educated and informed, responsible people as companions or 
interested participants in whatever process in society have to think 
about the exigencies of the environment in which they act in terms of 
the most vulnerable among them.  
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• The choice between consumerist and reflective thinking  
To solve the thorny issue of a “happy combination” of individual 
desires and the common good is to negotiate the relative 
significance of all interests, all consequences and outcomes, all 
inputs and responsibilities with a guaranteed voicing of the 
challenges to the weakest among the participants. The crucial issue 
in this respect is the choice between consumerist thinking and 
reflective thinking. Do we dispose of the insistent and insoluble 
individual case by subsuming it under a manageable general 
procedure, subjugating it to a class to which it does not really 
belong, and therefore submerging it under the indifference of 
bureaucratic disposal techniques, and thereby, effectively, eradicate 
it?  Or do we acknowledge the insistent and apparently insoluble 
case, tracing its significance with patience and imagination, in order 
to accommodate it, shift our own parameters to have this case as a 
neighbour, and reinforce our conviviality? 
4. Humanities after Auschwitz 
This is the cue that the critique of ideology has taken up from the 
project of the modern. When power can be maintained by controlling 
public knowledge, consumerist knowledge wipes out the traces of 
that which does not fall into the categories. The world is portrayed in 
the image of the stakeholder(s) in power, i.e. the one or the few who 
stand to gain from the control over resources, decision processes or 
interests. Whatever cannot be identified with the powerful, is 
perceived, evaluated and branded as the hostile other, and needs to 
be played off the field or the market, locked up in its own space, 
banned to the ghetto, or exterminated.  
• The critique of ideology 
The critique of ideology takes up the cudgels for the non-identical, 
for those who cannot identify with the universalised particular 
interest. The critique of ideology displaces the hero as the botched 
up embodiment of the common good and protests the annexation of 
the space of the common good. It is forced to tone down the 
optimistic language of the project of the modern. Instead of 
imagining the “lasting commonwealth” in terms of ideals, depicted by 
artistic figures, the critique of ideology focuses on the fact that the 
realisation of the “lasting commonwealth” is in limbo, and what 
needs to be addressed is suffering without a voice. Beauty has to be 
understood as an index of the true and the false human interests in 
the evolution of society. Beauty is ambivalent: it may serve as the 
symbol which reminds humanity of what is still to be attained, but it 
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may also serve to mask and decorate current injustices. Playing 
Mozart in Auschwitz may be an expression of the victim’s longing for 
conviviality, but it can also be the cynic dress-up of barbarism. 
Adorno realised this, and issued his verdict: to write a poem after 
Auschwitz will be barbaric. One could not be found to be an 
accomplice in covering up the unspeakably horrific place/event by 
decorating it. Therefore Adorno chose the dissonant, in art, and in 
his intellectual work (cf. Adorno, 1972:78-9). He confronted the 
ultimate Ungeselligkeit of his time with its own shocking lack of 
humaneness, for the sake of a sociability that is more becoming of a 
redeemed humanity. 
Today critical thought (which does not abandon its commitment 
even in the face of progress) demands support for the residues 
of freedom, and for tendencies toward true humanism, even if 
these seem powerless in regard to the main course of history 
(Adorno & Horkheimer, 1992:xi-x). 
The evolution of modern society has resulted in very skewered 
structures and processes. Too many pay the price for the progress 
enjoyed by too few. This is a platitude, but unfortunately the hard 
and oppressive reality for large parts of the world, and exacerbated 
by globalism today.2 To be involved in the study of human 
                                      
2 A random quote from Joseph Stiglitz, a former vice-president of the World Bank 
and Nobel Prize laureate, bears this out:  
Part of the social contract entails ‘fairness’, that the poor share in the 
gains of society as it grows, and that the rich share in the pains of 
society in times of crisis. The Washington Consensus policies paid 
little attention to issues of distribution or ‘fairness’. If pressed, many of 
its proponents would argue that the best way to help the poor is to 
make the economy grow. They believe in trickle-down economics. 
Eventually, it is asserted, the benefits of that growth trickle down even 
to the poor. Trickle-down economics was never much more than just a 
belief, an article of faith. Pauperism seemed to grow in nineteenth-
century England even though the country as a whole prospered. 
Growth in America in the 1980s provided the most recent dramatic 
example: while the economy grew, those at the bottom saw their real 
incomes decline. The Clinton administration had argued strongly 
against trickle-down economics; it believed that there had to be active 
programs to help the poor. And when I left the White House to go to 
the World Bank, I brought with me the same skepticism of trickle-down 
economics; if this had not worked in the United States, why would it 
work in developing countries? While it is true that sustained reductions 
in poverty cannot be attained without robust economic growth, the 
converse is not true: growth need not benefit all. It is not true that ‘a 
rising tide lifts all boats’. Sometimes, a quickly rising tide, especially 
when accompanied by a storm, dashes weaker boats against the 
shore, smashing them to smithereens (Stiglitz, 2002:78). 
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endeavours, therefore, has lost nothing of its edge as Kant has 
defined it more than two hundred years ago. The cultivation of the 
capabilities to understand in a profound sense, and to communicate 
in a very intimate fashion in order to facilitate Geselligkeit or a 
lasting commonwealth, is still the most justifiable option for 
humanity. But is it still viable after two hundred years?   
• The political relevance of art 
Most probably this question can, however, be asked: How on earth 
can one play Beethoven’s piano music today, and be of good faith 
that the social parable contained in its performance can change the 
world in the direction of a “merry gathering of the different”, as 
Adorno once defined the utopia of the lasting commonwealth?3
Daniel Barenboim did just that, quite recently. In Ramallah, in a 
bombed Palestinian school hall, for approximately 100 students. He 
played Beethoven sonatas. The Jew, for the Palestinians. Testifying 
to the world of the “residues of freedom, and ... tendencies toward 
true humanism” contained in a German’s music, admonishing Jews, 
Palestinians, and the world, to give peace another try.4
                                      
3 “Das Gefühl der Internationale lag mir von Haus aus nahe, auch durch den 
Gästekreis meiner Eltern, mit Namen wie Firino und Sidney Clifton Hall. Jene 
Internationale war kein Einheitsstaat. Ihr Friede versprach sich durch das 
festliche Ensemble von Verschiedenem, farbig gleich den Flaggen und den 
unschuldigen Grenzpfählen, die, wie ich staunend entdeckte, so gar keinen 
Wechsel der Landschaft bewirkten. Das Land aber, das sie umschlossen, und 
das ich, spielend mit mir selbst, okkupierte, war ein Niemandsland. Später, im 
Krieg, tauchte das Wort auf für den verwüsteten Raum vor den beiden Fronten. 
Es ist aber die getreue Übersetzung des griechischen – Aristophanischen – das 
ich damals desto besser verstand, je weniger ich es kannte, Utopie” (Adorno 
1973b:23-24; italics added). 
4 Cf. http://www.danielbarenboim.com; item on Barenboim playing in Ramallah 
under “news” on the homepage. He expressed his views on the political 
relevance of music in his acceptance speech when he received the Prince of 
Asturias Award (together with Edward Said) on October 25, 2002. Among other 
things, he averred: 
Concord is expressed in music as harmony. An orchestra requires 
musicians to listen to each other; none should attempt to play louder 
than the next, they must respect and know each other. It is a song in 
praise of respect, of the effort to understand one another, something 
that is crucial to resolve a conflict that has no military solution. The 
political solution may still be far off at the present time, which 
strengthens my belief that a person's essential obligation is to reflect, 
to act within his own means. I believe an independent movement 
uniting both people could be born in this way, and it would help by 
contributing to vanquishing the hate that stands between them 
nowadays. […] We live in a world of permanent contrasts, between 
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But how does this act translate into any kind of “social” or “political 
action”? Let me illustrate by an example. I want to use a poem by 
Paul Celan. Not the poem that forced Adorno to retract his 
statement on poetry after Auschwitz,5 viz. “Death Fugue” 
(Todesfuge), but a poem from the same book (i.e. Mohn und 
Gedächtnis [Poppy and Remembrance] published in 1952): 
Aspen tree, your leaves glance white into the dark. 
My mother’s hair never turned white. 
Dandelion, so green is the Ukraine. 
My fair-haired mother did not come home. 
Rain cloud, do you linger over the well? 
My soft-voiced mother weeps for all. 
Round star, you coil the golden loop. 
My mother’s heart was hurt by lead. 
                                                                                                              
harmony and dissonance, between injustice and rational behaviour, 
between the denial of the right to expression and dialogue, between 
the darkness of violence and the splendour of humanism. We find 
arguments to remind us that the history of man provides permanent 
example of the negative side of these equations every day. / Many 
centuries ago, in the Kingdom of Asturias, the Holy Man of Liébana, 
made one of the most splendid contributions to Western culture. He 
evoked a celestial Jerusalem in his work within the framework of a 
vision of the Apocalypse. However, a different paradise was being 
forged not so far from here, with the contributions of Muslims, 
Christians and Jews. / The fact that two friends, two brothers, have 
managed to launch our small project, the fact that you are here today 
paying tribute to this effort, leads us to ponder the more positive side 
of human nature, and brings us hope that perhaps between us all, 
between you and us, we might provide the Palestinian and Jewish 
peoples with something without which man cannot live: hope in a 
better life, which should unquestionably manifest itself in a Jerusalem 
on earth where men can coexist, keeping their identities, creating a 
bridge between west and east. (Cf. http://www.fpa.es/ing/2002 
special/02/04/index03.html as well as Barenboim’s and Edward Said’s 
exchange of views on this in Guzelimian, 2002.)  
 It is interesting to compare Barenboim’s sentiments about music with Adorno’s 
very similar views on chamber music (cf. Adorno 1973a:271 ff.). Of course, this 
comparison of music with an ideal society begs the question, viz. how was 
Auschwitz possible in spite of Mozart and Beethoven? Friedlander (1993) and 
Todorov (1996) have attempted to answer this question in depth and detail, and 
my paper is a small attempt to cut grafts from their work. 
5 Cf. Adorno 1955:31: “… nach Auschwitz ein Gedicht zu schreiben, ist 
barbarisch, und das frißt auch die Erkenntnis an, die ausspricht, warum es 
unmöglich ward, heute Gedichte zu schreiben”. “Das perennierende Leiden hat 
soviel Recht auf Ausdruck wie der Gemarterte zu Brüllen; darum mag falsch 
gewesen sein, nach Auschwitz ließe kein Gedicht mehr sich schreiben” 
(Adorno, 1967:353). 
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Oaken door, who hove you off your hinge? 
My gentle mother cannot return. 
  (Translation: John Felstiner [Felstiner, 2001:49].) 
This poem mourns the brutal death of Paul Celan’s mother at the 
hands of the Nazis. It is a poem about a traumatic loss – the theme 
of Celan’s entire oeuvre. It is an attempt to find a face to whom he 
can talk intimately again. The loss of a significant face threatens his 
language. The loss of the significant face can annihilate words, and 
consequently his own self. To find language to express the 
unthinkable – the senseless death of a Jewish woman – is a very 
conscious act of protest. Celan chose to write in German, and not 
Yiddish. He chose the language of the perpetrator to articulate his 
sense of void, attempting to force the German language to work 
through (durcharbeiten) the unspeakable itself6: to transform from 
murderous language of command to language of mournful silence. 
5. Humanities as diakonia 
Where does this leave us? How can the Kantian injunction to come 
up with a reflective judgement redeem any residue of freedom or 
support any true humanity? I surmise that a possible reflective 
judgement on Celan’s poem may be that this poem is ultimately 
about a world in which mothers are murdered for no reason at all by 
people who have no cause at all to commit such crimes. Or more 
positively: this poem is about the integrity of life, where mothers are 
present, where their faces are significant to illicit the most 
constitutive kind of communication one can think of – the sharing of 
life between a mother and a child. 
                                      
6 Durcharbeiten in Lyotard’s sense:  
Words, phrases in the act of writing, the latent nuances and timbres at 
the horizon of a painting or a musical composition as it’s being created 
[…] all lend themselves to us for the occasion and yet slip through our 
fingers. And even inscribed on a page or canvas, they ‘say’ something 
other than what we ‘meant’ because they’re older than the present 
intent, overloaded with possibilities of meaning – that is, connected 
with other words, phrases, shades of meaning, timbres. By means of 
which precisely they constitute a field, a ‘world’, the ‘brave’ human 
world […], but one that’s probably more like an opaqueness of very 
distant horizons that exist only so that we’ll ‘brave’ them. If you think 
you’re describing thought when you describe a selecting of data, 
you’re silencing truth. Because data aren’t given, but givable, and 
selection isn’t choice. Thinking, like writing or painting, is almost no 
more than letting a giveable come towards you (Lyotard 1991:18; cf. 
also p. 26, 29, 74 and 173). 
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This poem is not a treatise on being human. It is an allusive, 
diaconical7 act of commemoration. As such, its communication 
happens beyond the realm of definitional, lexicographical and 
standardised, conceptual language. It is the kind of language “that 
prompt[s] much thought”, but we are at a loss for definite concepts. 
But not completely, and not for all time. The horrors of the twentieth 
century precipitated the expected volume of recorded memories, 
and, true to pattern, the recording of these memories subsided after 
a time.  
• Memory cannot be forced underground 
Most unexpectedly, however, life did not return to normality after a 
time. The extent of the horrors of the twentieth century was too vast 
to be absorbed in its aftershocks. The trauma of victims persisted 
this time, they were even transmitted generationally.8 Grandchildren 
show the symptoms of grandparents. At least Western society had 
to learn to cope with a past that did not want to go away.9 Memory 
had to be rehabilitated. Memory had to be reworked in order to 
make it bearable.10 Memory cannot be forced underground. 
Unbearable truth and conspiracies of silence are social and political 
time-bombs. Too much memory and too little memory is foolishness. 
If the public realm becomes filled up, even saturated by memories of 
unspeakable atrocities, artistic catharsis may channel the need for 
social justice up to a certain point, but at a critical stage the 
aesthetic energy has to impact on the need for legal 
transformation.11  
                                      
7 Cf. Pop (1964:102 ff.). 
8 Cf. Danieli (1981). 
9 Cf. Ernst Nolte, “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will.“ (In Augstein et al. 
1987:39 ff.) 
10 Cf. Rüsen (1998); Todorov (1996:254-296). 
11 Hannah Arendt suggests as much. Cf. Arendt on the rights to have rights 
(Arendt, 1986:462-463) and the need for representations of redemption. She 
warns against a “ype“ of cultural observer for whom “beim Anblick dieser Filme 
oder beim Lesen jener Reportagen  [of the organised mass destruction of 
human beings – JS] aufgeht, […] daß die Macht des Menschen größer ist, als 
sie sich einzugestehen wagten, und daß man höllische Phantasien realisieren 
kann, ohne daß der Himmel einstürzt und die Erde sich auftut. / Das einzige, 
was nicht realisierbar bleibt, ist zugleich dasjenige, was allein die traditionellen 
Höllenvorstellungen erträglich machte: das Jüngste Gericht und die Vorstellung 
eines absoluten Maßstabes der Gerechtigkeit, verbunden mit der unendlichen 
Möglichkeit der Gnade“ (Arendt ,1986:686). 
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• The unsayable calls for words to be heard 
Artistic expressions such as Celan’s, or the gesture of Barenboim, 
remind us of the unsayable that is calling for words to be heard and 
to be understood so that something can be done about it. The world 
must be transformed so that mothers can be safe and nurture their 
children. The ultimate diaconical act will be to afford victims, all lost 
sheep from the flock of the human race, proper acknowledgement 
and recognition, to unburden them of their burden of unrecognised 
suffering, to assist them in the healing of their trust in the world, and 
to let them have a future again – to confirm them in their rightful 
place among others inhabiting the world.  
It took us two hundred years to see, learn and start to do something 
about this. Kant wrote his treatise on perpetual peace in 1795. 
Hannah Arendt realised that history run amok cannot be influenced 
for the better by pressing for more morality, applying moral norms to 
more situations. According to Arendt politics had to do with the 
imaginative, productive reflective judgement. Through “anticipatory 
anxiety” the universal feeling of sympathy could be rehabilitated: the 
call was for people to imagine themselves in the shoes of a victim, 
and then think of what the world must be in order to be safe and a 
real haven for human beings.12 This call brought the experience of 
otherness within grasp of many, at least touching people in the 
public realm. Activists and non-governmental organisations like the 
Red Cross, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch took up 
a sensitised public opinion and worked through international 
agencies to establish international treaties.13 Two hundred years 
after Kant’s admonitions to cultivate the mental powers to effect a 
lasting commonwealth which is befitting of humanity, humankind 
indeed did take the first reluctant and coy steps to ensure a world 
that is safe for mothers and children. Or as Van Riessen formulated 
it as a critically concerned Christian: “We may not deprive a human 
being of her calling. That will be an impairment of her humanity 
when we think and act in her behalf in such a way that her freedom 
becomes redundant” (Van Riessen, 1966:52). Beethoven’s music, 
Celan’s poetry, Anselm Kiefer’s paintings,14 Joseph Beuys’ 
                                      
12 Arendt (1986:680-681). 
13 Cf. Ignatieff (1999); Robertson (2000). 
14 Cf. Saltzman (1999).  
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sculpture15 (to name but a few) are not in vain. Because these 
works of art are performed, read and exhibited we have international 
conventions against genocide and torture. The impunity of heads of 
state is a thing of the past. Torturers cannot sleep soundly today 
because the screams of their victims do reverberate16 – through the 
work of artists, in memories, in human endeavours such as narrative 
histories and therapies, critical hermeneutics and critical 
jurisprudence. A survey of work in these disciplines show how they 
are informed by the work of artists in the first place.17
• Profound understanding and honest communication 
To be informed by works of art in the humanities does not make the 
world a good place or a beautiful space to live in. We are far from 
that. However, we do make progress, precious little steps that must 
be cherished. Today, as in Kant’s time, we are still faced by the 
problem of breaking through universalised particular interests to 
attain proper universal good. We still struggle to turn ethnic 
imperatives into truly ethic imperatives. We say “Never again!” on 21 
March, or on 27 April, maybe on 12 September if we remember 
Steve Biko. But what do we mean when we say it? That we vow that 
these things will never happen to us and ours again, or do we also 
imply that we vow that we shall never be party to any such 
atrocities?  Do we reconstitute ourselves as intersubjectively re-
sponsible and re-member-ed people through such rituals? It is of the 
utmost importance that we cultivate our capabilities to understand 
adequately and profoundly, and to communicate our most intimate 
awarenesses. These are crucial enzymes of the body politic. 
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